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ABSTRACT 
 
This work investigates association between crime and democracy drawing on information 
for 44 countries during the second half of the 20th century. Crime is indicated by national 
homicide rates, which minimize reliability problems implicated in cross-national and/or 
longitudinal comparisons of police recorded crime rates. Democracy is measured by the 
set of indicators included in the Polity data set, University of Maryland, U.S. Multilevel 
or hierarchical repeated measures models of homicide rates over each democracy 
indicator are estimated while controlling for time, population profile, economic 
development and inequality as well as regional idiosyncracies. The multilevel 
specification allows for country and annual random variations of the predicted values and 
estimated relationships.  
 
Apart from complete lack of any relationship three types of links are plausible between 
crime and democracy. Democracy may increase crime due to instability and lax state 
control over its citizens. It may reduce it owing to citizens’ enhanced sense of communal 
responsibility and trust in their political institutions. Finally democracy and crime may 
exhibit an inverted-U relationship. The first and last relationships are evidenced in the 
present -and to the authors’ knowledge only international- study on crime and democracy 
to date depending on the severity of autocracy democracy is contrasted with. 
(201 WORDS) 
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Suggested running head: Democratisation and Crime 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Two of the most significant trends in the second half of the twentieth century are 
rarely discussed in the same sentence:  the dramatic rise in the proportion of the world’s 
countries that are democracies and the steady increase in global violent crime rates.  The 
“third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1993) that got under way in the early 1970s 
has produced an unprecedented number of new democratic countries.  This rapid political 
transformation began in Southern Europe in the 1970s, spread to Latin America and parts 
of Asia in the 1980s, and then moved on to parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Potter 1997). While more 
countries than ever before have attained democracy in the sense of constitutionalism and 
multiparty electoral competition, an even larger number have adopted at least a partial 
framework for democratic governance.  Annual Surveys by Freedom House (2002) show 
that in 1975, less than one-third of the world’s countries had partially democratic regimes 
(including competitive elections and formal guarantees of political and civil rights); by 
1995, nearly three-quarters did.   
But during the same period, there is substantial evidence that global rates of violent 
crime have also surged.   In a recent cross-national study of homicide victimization rates 
in 34 countries, LaFree and Drass (2002) found that on average, homicide rates doubled 
during the last four decades of the twentieth century.  Similarly, Fukuyama (1999:4) 
claims that there was a “great disruption” among western industrialized countries 
beginning in the 1960’s which created large increases in violent crime and social disorder 
among most industrialized countries of the world.  More pointedly, there is at least some 
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evidence that rapid increases in violent crime have been especially pronounced in 
precisely those regions of the world in which democracy has recently taken hold, 
including Latin America (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza, 1998; Diamond, 1999; 
Mendez et al., 1999),  Eastern Europe and the “break away” republics of the former 
Soviet Union (Hraba et al., 1998; Barak, 2000; Backman, 1999; Savelsberg 1995),  and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Reza Mercy and Krug 2000; Human Sciences 2002). 
Despite the apparent correlation between the spread of democracy and levels of 
violent crime, we could find no study to date that has systematically examined whether 
the wave of democratization in the last half of the twentieth century can help explain the 
global rise in violent crime rates.  The absence of research on connections between 
democracy and crime is surprising because several of the leading theoretical perspectives 
on cross-national crime are closely related to the rapid rise of market-based democratic 
societies.  Thus, Elias’s civilization perspective (1939) predicts that the spread of 
western-styled democratic regimes will transform systems of social control and greatly 
reduce violent crime rates; conflict theorists (Chambliss 1976; Bohm 1982) argue that the 
income inequality and poverty generated by market-based democratic countries will 
result in the explosive growth of crime; and Durkheim’s modernization perspective 
(1933, 1950) predicts increases in crime as societies undergo the kind of rapid 
transformation that is the hallmark of democratization. In this paper we build on these 
competing perspectives to develop three hypotheses about the effect of democratization 
on violent crime rates. We then test these hypotheses via random effects multilevel 
repeated measures modelling using annual time series data on for 43 countries from 1950 
to 2000.  
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A PARAGRAPH SELLING IT. CONTRIBUTION /VALUE ADDED: 1. 
THEORETICAL, 2. MODELLING & INTERPRETATION, 3. LARGE DATA SET. 
The next section explores the relationship between crime and democratisation 
according to the aforementioned mainstream political perspectives and respective 
previous empirical results. Thereafter the data employed and statistical modelling of this 
study are discussed (sections 3 and 4 respectively). The results of the empirical modelling 
are presented in section 5. A re-assessment of the conflicting theoretical perspectives in 
the light of our empirical results, possible shortcomings of this analysis and suggestions 
for future research conclude this paper. 
 
2. THEORETICAL STRANDS 
Democracy, Civilization and Crime 
While the argument that the growing strength of market economies will reduce 
interpersonal violence because such economies increasingly depend on the self control 
and rationality of their citizens can be traced directly to Weber (1920), Elias 
([1939]1978) is probably best known for making the argument with specific regard to 
violent crime trends. And although Elias’s civilization perspective does not directly 
reference the role of democratization in reducing crime, his arguments are nevertheless 
centered on a set of West European democracies (especially England, France, and 
Germany). Elias predicts long term declines in rates of violent crime among these West 
European democracies through two related processes. First, as modern democracies 
develop, they increasingly claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Thus, 
common crimes involving family members and close acquaintances that in earlier periods 
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were routinely avenged by relatives and friends of the perceived wronged party are 
increasingly regarded as public matters and the subject of formal penal law.  Second, 
Elias argues that along with urbanization and the growing division of labor, citizens of 
West European democracies are embedded in increasingly complex social configurations 
such that advancing individual self interest less often requires the use of violence.  
Instead, more sophisticated action strategies are required, which result in increased levels 
of self control and declining violent crime rates.   
To support his arguments about the declining levels of interpersonal violence in 
western democracies, Elias relied mostly on qualitative evidence of the growth of 
civilized behaviour through such indicators as advice in etiquette books and changes in 
children’s literature.  But more recently, historical analysis of long-term crime trends has 
been generally supportive of the conclusion that rates of personal violent crime among 
industrialized western countries declined from the early Middle Ages until the second 
half of the twentieth century (Gurr 1981; Osterberg 1996; Spierenburg 1996).  In the 
most comprehensive study to date, Eisner (2001) examines homicide rates from the 
thirteenth through the twentieth centuries for England, the Netherlands, Belgium, the 
Scandinavian countries, Germany, Switzerland and Italy.  For each analysis he finds 
evidence for substantial decline in homicide rates from the early Middle Ages until the 
mid-twentieth century.   
However, Elias’s predictions seem to be contradicted by crime trends following 
World War II.  In their study of crime trends in four cities for 150 years, Gurr, Grabosky 
and Hula (1977:169) conclude that “some common social and political dynamics created 
public order over the course of a century in western societies, then went crazily unsprung 
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in a single generation”.  More recently, LaFree and Drass (2002) show substantial 
increases in homicide rates for a sample of 34 mostly industrialized countries from 1958 
to 1998.  Likewise, Eisner’s (2001) analysis of seven West European democratic 
countries and regions all show an increase in homicide rates beginning after 1950.  Thus, 
while there is evidence that violent crime rates among western-styled democracies 
declined during much of the seven centuries leading into the twentieth century, violent 
crime rates seem to have increased in most western democracies since World War II.  
However for our purposes, such conclusions must be tempered by the fact that no study 
to date has specifically examined connections between levels of democratization and 
violent crime rates for a large sample of countries. 
  
Democracy, Market Economies and Crime 
As with the civilization perspective, proponents of the conflict perspective (Taylor, 
Walton and Young 1973; Chambliss 1976; Bohm 1982) claim that the evolving economic 
structure of western democracies is a critical determinant of their violent crime rates.  
However, instead of arguing that a growing reliance on market economies reduces violent 
crime by increasing rationality, mutual trust and self control, conflict theorists, instead 
argue that the capitalist market economies that have been widely associated with 
democratization have raised violent crime rates by increasing economic inequality, 
unemployment and social misery both within and between countries.  Within countries, 
the dominance of market economies encourages a growing gap between the rich and the 
poor, which raises violent crime rates by encouraging greed, selfishness and diffused 
aggression (Bonger 1916; Quinney 1977; Blau and Blau 1982:119).  Between countries 
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this gap is reproduced at the international level as the world economy increasingly 
separates an elite group of highly industrialized western democracies from a much larger 
group of poor, economically dependent countries.   
As Neuman and Berger (1988) have pointed out, these conflict arguments can be 
readily combined with similar predictions from world system theorists (Wallerstein 1979; 
Hopkins and Wallerstein 1981; Chirot and Hall 1982), who conceptualize the world as 
divided between “core” countries that prosper by extracting raw materials and exploiting 
low cost labor from “peripheral countries”. As the economic gap between the industrial 
“haves” and the developing “have-not’s” widens, poverty, slums and unemployment 
become more commonplace among the latter. The growing expansion of global markets 
creates a fluctuating surplus population of unemployed and underemployed workers 
(Spitzer 1975; Applebaum 1978). The global system also constrains urban development 
in peripheral countries, which suffer increasingly from a shortage of decent housing, an 
absence of basic social services and a lack of living wages, all of which drive crime rates 
up. Thus, to the extent that democracies continue to be closely tied to market economies, 
the conflict perspective predicts that democratization should increase violent crime rates.   
The same research on post-World War II violent crime trends that seems to challenge 
the civilization perspective (Fukuayama 1999; LaFree and Drass 2002) can be seen as 
supporting the conflict perspective.  There are also a growing number of regional studies 
which are consistent with the idea that democratization has been associated with rapidly 
increasing violent crime rates.  This connection is especially common in studies of the 
newly emerging democratic countries of Eastern Europe since the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union (Hraba et al., 1998; Barak, 2000; Backman, 1999).  Thus, in a recent study 
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of crime trends in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, Cebulak (1996:77) concludes 
that there have been Αunprecedented and dramatic increases in crime.≅   Similarly, 
Stamatel et al. (1998:243) warn that democratization and economic liberalization in the 
Central Eastern European countries (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary) 
are leading to an ΑAmericanization≅ which is producing rapid crime increases.  
However, as with the civilization argument, these studies do not directly measure levels 
of democratization and the regional studies concentrate mostly on very recent crime 
trends and hence, do not rule out the possibility that crime rates were equally high during 
earlier periods.   
Many researchers and social observers have also noted that the growing crime 
problems of Latin American countries appear to have coincided with democratization in 
this region ( Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza, 1998; Diamond, 1999; Mendez et al., 
1999; Savelsberg 1995). Thus, Fajnzylber et al. (1998) use United Countries survey data 
to conclude that after a period of relative stability during the 1980s, homicide rates in 
Latin American countries rose sharply in the 1990s. This conclusion is echoed in a report 
by the Mexican Health Foundation (1999) which shows that several Mexican states 
experienced major crime increases following the economic crisis of the mid-1990s.  
Similar warnings are being sounded with increasing frequency in the fledgling 
democracy of South Africa (Human Sciences 2002). But again while informative, these 
studies have thus far not explicitly measured levels of democratization, and have most 
often relied on case studies or cross-sectional analysis.   
 
Violent Crime and the Transition to Democracy 
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A modernization perspective on crime (Clinard and Abbott 1973; Shelley 1981; 
Neumann and Berger 1988) can be traced directly to Durkheim’s ([1893] 1947) 
assessment of the transition from traditional to modern society. According to this view, 
crime results when modern values and norms come into contact with and disrupt older, 
established systems of role allocation.  The emergence of new roles not yet fully 
institutionalized and integrated into society, make normative guidelines ambiguous and 
weaken traditional support mechanisms.  These basic processes have been linked to rising 
crime rates and other forms of deviance through a range of distinct, yet closely related 
concepts, including anomie (Merton 1938; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997), social 
disorganization (Davies 1962; Smelser 1962), breakdown (Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975; 
Useem 1985), tension (Lodhi and Tilly 1973) and strain (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; 
Agnew 1992). 
 Nearly all the cross-national comparative tests of the modernization  perspective to 
date have relied on cross-sectional multivariate analysis in which measures of 
development (most often, GNP or GDP) are included in statistical models that predict 
homicide rates (for reviews, see Neapolitan, 1997;  LaFree, 1999; Gartner, 2000). In 
general, empirical support for a connection between economic development and 
homicide rates from these studies has been weak.  In fact, contrary to the modernization 
perspective, most of these tests have found that measures of economic development 
either have no effect (Bennett, 1991; Messner, 1989) or a negative effect (Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 1997; Neapolitan, 1996) on crime rates leading Neumann and Berger 
(1988:300) to question the “continued dominance“ of the perspective.   
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However, as LaFree and Drass (2002:774) note, it may be the case that most prior 
studies have not offered the most appropriate test of the modernization perspective. The 
idea of modernization is inherently longitudinal:  As countries transition from traditional 
to modern, they experience a series of changes that weaken their social control 
mechanisms and make their normative guidelines ambiguous. All the research that has 
tested modernization views of crime to date has been based on cross-sectional designs 
that measure both crime rates and modernization measures at one point in time. By 
contrast, in their longitudinal study of homicide rates in 34 nations from 1956 to 1998, 
LaFree and Drass find considerable support for a modernization perspective:  70 percent 
of industrialized countries in the study had experienced homicide “booms” (defined as 
rates that increase rapidly and exhibit a positive sustained change in direction) during this 
period compared to fewer than 21 percent of industrializing countries.  
Unlike predictions from either civilization or conflict perspectives, the modernization 
perspective predicts that the effects of democratization on crime should correspond only 
to the transitional phase of democratization. Thus, crime rates should increase as 
autocratic countries begin experimenting with democracy, but should again diminish 
once a fully democratic regime has emerged. 
While we could identify no prior research that has explicitly examined the possibility 
that countries transitioning to democracy will experience elevated levels of violent crime 
but that these levels will diminish once a full democracy is established, there is some 
support for such a relationship between democracy and other types of crime and 
deviance. Thus, in an analysis of cross-national data for the period 1980 to 1983, 
Montinola and Jackman (2002) examine the relationship between measures of democracy 
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(from Bollen 1993) and perceived national levels of corruption and find that the highest 
corruption levels were in transitional democracies rather than either fully democratic or 
autocratic countries. Similarly, in a recent study of cross-national connections between 
measures of democracy (from Freedom House) and perceived levels of organized crime, 
Sung (forthcoming 2003, GARY IS THIS OUT BY NOW?) found that levels of 
organized crime were highest among those democratic countries in transition from full 
autocracy to full democracy.    
To summarize then, our review suggests four competing hypotheses about the 
relationship between levels of democracy and violent crime rates during the second half 
of the twentieth century. The null hypothesis for this study is that there is no connection 
between the two. A civilization perspective predicts that violent crime rates will decline 
as autocratic regimes give way to democratic ones. A conflict perspective predicts that 
the market economies associated with democratic countries will increase rates of violent 
crime as they move away from autocracy and toward democracy. Finally, a 
modernization perspective suggests that violent crime rates will be highest in countries 
that are transitioning between autocracy and democracy.   
 
3. DATA AND VARIABLE SELECTION 
3.1. Homicide Data 
 Substantial variation across countries in legal definitions has increasingly lead 
researchers (Archer and Gartner 1984; Huang and Wellford 1989; Lynch 1995) to rely on 
homicide data in cross-national comparative research. There is now substantial agreement 
(Kalish 1988; Neapolitan 1997; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997) that among the major 
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cross-national homicide data sources, those collected by the World Health Organization 
(hereafter WHO) are the most valid and reliable. WHO homicide data are based on cause 
of death reports submitted by participating countries.   
Annual time-series data from WHO on homicide victimization rates per 100,000 
residents for 44 countries for varying years between 1950 and 2000 are employed here.  
The length of the series and the countries included were determined by data availability.  
We did not extrapolate values to the beginning or the end of individual series and 
excluded countries that had missing data for more than three consecutive years. Rates for 
Israel are reported only for the Jewish population. We interpolated one year for Israel that 
included deaths from the Six-Day War (1967). Several political changes affected the 
geographical boundaries and perhaps the homicide rates of the countries included. Our 
analysis of Czechoslovakia is based on the Czech Republic after the political break up of 
1992. Data for Germany refer to the Federal Republic of Germany until 1990 and the 
unified Germany afterwards. Similarly, French statistics include Algeria until 1962. 
Table 1 shows the sample of countries and years employed in this study together with 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of homicide rates for each 
country in the sample. There is considerable variability in the total number of years of 
data that are available for each country, ranging from a maximum of 51 years to a 
minimum of just eight years (for Estonia). In total of 1,827 country-year data points 
available for the analysis 31 countries (i.e. 70.4%) have at least 40 years of data.  
Table 1 about here  
Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 1 is the tremendous variation in average 
homicide rates represented by the countries in our study. Indeed mean homicide rates 
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range from a high of 37.36 per 100,000 (Colombia) to a low of 0.60 per 100,000 (Ireland 
and Spain). All eight countries with average homicide rates that are less than one per 
100,000 are West European: Denmark, England/Wales, France, Iceland, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Spain. Another 18 countries (40.9%) have homicide rates 
between one and two per 100,000 over the time period examined. This group includes the 
rest of the West European countries (with the exception of Finland), all five of the 
Western Pacific countries, three of the five countries from Eastern Europe, Canada and 
Israel. Four countries have mean homicide rates between two and three per 100,000: 
Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Mauritius. Twelve of the fifteen countries with homicide 
rates over three per 100,000 are in the western hemisphere. These include all eleven Latin 
American/Caribbean countries of the sample, as well as the United States (henceforth 
U.S.), Estonia, the Philippines and Thailand.  
Figure 1 shows average homicide rates from 1950 to 2000 for the 31 countries with at 
least 40 years of data. Since 1950 the average homicide rates across these 31 countries 
fluctuated around a low exponential trend, which has been accentuated due to doubling 
figures after 1998.  
Figure 1 about here 
The natural logarithm (ln) of homicide rates after moving up the series by 0.01 are 
modelled in the subsequent analysis to account for the highly skewed distribution1 seen 
in Table 1 and controlling for time the exponential trend seen in Figure 1. 
  
3.2. Democratisation Measures 
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The democratization measures employed in this analysis come from the Polity data 
originally collected by Gurr and his associates (Gurr 1974; Gurr and Jaggers, and Moore 
1990; Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Marhall and Jaggers 2003). Two composite indicators, 
namely democracy and polity, and five individual measures, i.e. competitiveness of 
participation, executive recruitment competition, executive constrains, regulation of 
participation and openness of executive recruitment, are alternative constructs of 
democratisation employed in this study. 
The Polity data defines institutional democracy in terms of: (1) institutions and 
procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative 
policies and leaders; (2) institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the chief 
executive; and (3) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in 
acts of political participation (Marshall and Jaggers 2003:12). The institutional 
democracy index in the Polity data is an 11-point scale ranging from autocratic to fully 
democratic. Given the theoretical arguments in the previous section, the scale has been 
recoded to distinguish autocratic regimes (0), transitional regimes (1-9) and fully 
democratic regimes (10).   
Since our sample includes nearly all major western democracies, it is unsurprising 
that fully democratic regimes were by far the most common outcome in the data, 
representing 58.8 percent of all country-year data points (see Table 2 below). By contrast, 
17.1 percent of the country-years in the sample had autocratic regimes while the 
remaining 24.1 percent qualified as transitional democracies based on the Polity data 
set(see Table 2 below).  
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Figure 2 shows the mean democratization level across the same 31 countries as in 
Figure 1 above with at least 40 years of data over the second part of the 20th century. 
According to Figure 2, democratization levels fluctuated around a U-shaped trend since 
1950 with minimum and maximum democracy values around 1973 and 1996, 
respectively. 
Figure 2 about here 
An alternative to institutional democracy index is the polity index. It is computed as 
the difference between autocracy and institutional democracy indices. The former, i.e. 
autocracy, reflects suppressed or restricted access to institutional structures for political 
expression by non-elites, restricted or factional development of institutional structures for 
political expression, chosen chief executives by hereditary succession, designation, or by 
a combination of both, and unlimited authority up to slight to moderate limitations in the 
operational independence of chief executive. The polity index was originally a scale 
ranging from minus 10 to 10. Here it has been recoded into three categories: rather 
autocratic regime (minus 10 to 0), rather democratic regime (1 to 9) and fully democratic 
regimes (10) to reflect the theoretical arguments, which this work draws upon2. A graph 
of average polity values across the 31 countries with at least 40 years of data drew a 
similar to Figure 2 picture and thus it is not presented here. 
The aforementioned composite democracy and polity indices have been constructed 
from a set of individual indicators pertaining to various features of institutional 
democracy. These individual democracy indicators are five. They are defined as follows: 
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¾ Competitiveness of participation measures “the extent to which non-elites are able to 
access institutional structures for political expression” (www.cidcm.umd.edu, Data 
and Codebook) 
¾ Executive recruitment competition gives “the extent to which executives are chosen 
through competitive elections” (www.cidcm.umd.edu, Data and Codebook) 
¾ Executive constraints measure the degree of “operational (de facto) independence of 
chief executive” (www.cidcm.umd.edu, Data and Codebook), which ranges from 
unlimited authority to executive parity or subordination, 
¾ Regulation of participation assesses the “development of institutional structure for 
political expression” (www.cidcm.umd.edu, Data and Codebook) and finally  
¾ Openness of executive recruitment represents “opportunity of non-elites to attain 
executive office” (www.cidcm.umd.edu, Data and Codebook).    
Each individual democracy indicator has been classified into three categories to reflect 
the theoretical arguments that this study draws upon (see section 2) except for openness 
of executive recruitment, which is a binary variable due to effective lack of middle points 
(see Table 2 below).  
Table 2 presents the observed distribution of each democracy indicator employed in 
our analysis. The majority of countries for the majority of the years in the sample have 
been fully democratic (58.8%), i.e. with competitive participation in the institutional 
structures for political expression (63.8%), election-based executive recruitment from 
two or more major parties or candidates (74.5%), executive parity or subordination to 
accountability groups (66.4 %), regulated participation (63.9%) and open executive 
recruitment (95%). As mentioned all democracy measures are categorical. The first 
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category of each indicator is used as the reference category or base in the empirical 
analysis below. This is indicated in brackets after the respective category in Table 2.  
Table 2 about here 
 
3.3. Control Variables 
Prior quantitative research on cross-national crime rates (for reviews, see Neapolitan 
1997; LaFree 1999; Gartner 200?) has most often included three types of measures:  
economic development, economic inequality, and population structure. Gross national 
product or gross domestic product has probably been the most commonly used economic 
development measures in past research (Bennett 1991; Fiala and LaFree 1988; Hansmann 
and Quigley 1982). Accordingly, the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per 
capita [ln(GDPpc) henceforth] is included in our data. 
 A positive association between economic inequality (usually measured by the Gini 
coefficient) and homicide rates is probably the most consistent finding in the cross-
national homicide literature (Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Neapolitan 1996; see LaFree 
1999 for a review). The Gini income inequality data employed in this study are from 
Deninger, Klaus and Squire (1999) while Professors Thor Herbertsson and Thorvaldur 
kindly provided Gini coefficients for Iceland. The mean value of the available ln(GDPpc) 
and Gini coefficients per country over the period under investigation are employed here 
due to missing annual observations. The unit of analysis of these variables is thus the 
country. 
Based on the widespread assumption that young people commit a disproportionate 
amount of violent crime, most prior studies of cross-national homicide (Messner 1989; 
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Bennett 1991; Ortega et al. 1992) have included a measure of the proportion of young 
people in each country. The percent population age 15 to 24 years old from the United 
Nations WHO is employed here.  
These measures are highly correlated especially the ones of economic development 
and inequality (r=-0.85). A composite indicator of a country’s Prosperity enters the 
models of this study. Prosperity has been constructed as {0.926[ln(GDPpc)-Gini]} on 
centred ln(GDPpc) and Gini coefficients with loadings given by preliminary principal 
components analysis3.  
Several regional variables are included in the analysis to control for substantial 
differences in homicide rates and for political changes in the countries under 
investigation here. In particular three regional dummy variables distinguish East 
European, Latin American/Caribbean countries and, because it consistently has much 
higher homicide rates than other highly industrialized countries, the U.S. Three more 
dummy variables account for major historic events via identifying France (1963-1999) 
after Algeria is excluded from its homicide statistics, Germany (1991-1999) after 
unification and the Czech Republic4. If homicide rates are not significantly different 
between France and Algeria, former Federal Republic of Germany and the unified 
Germany or former Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic these historic changes would 
be without consequence for our study. Indeed preliminary analysis showed effectively no 
effect of these “historic events” on homicide rates5. The respective dummy variables are 
thus excluded from subsequent discussion.    
The frequency distributions of regional dummy variables are given in Table 2. This 
table also presents the overall mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values 
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of the percentage of population 15 to 24 years old, the composite indicator of Prosperity 
and its individual components, i.e. ln(GDPpc) and the Gini coefficient, over the sample 
of countries and years in this study. To facilitate interpretation of the results in the 
discussion below these variables have been centred round their mean value. An indication 
of the persistence of political regimes has also been included to account for the 
theoretical notion of citizens’ trust in their institutions. In particular regime stability 
counts the number of years since the beginning of our data series, namely 1950, that the 
democracy or polity indices remained unchanged. The description of this variable, which 
was extracted from the Polity data set, ends Table 2. In the later estimated models regime 
stability affects homicide rates only via its interaction with the democracy or polity 
composite indicators. The source of each data series employed in this study is given 
below Table 2. 
 
4. STATISTICAL MODEL 
The observations of this study stretch both over time and across countries 
representing thus a data structure known as “unbalanced repeated measures” (Snijders 
and Bosker 1999). Such data structures can be appropriately analysed using a multilevel 
repeated measures approach6 (Raudenbush 1995; Goldstein 1995). Apart from estimating 
any fixed effects of time and/or country-specific explanatory variables on the dependent 
variable (as in conventional regression analysis) this method allows also for the 
estimation of any within and between subjects variability of the predicted values.  
The units of analysis of the multilevel models of this study are at two levels7. Level 1 
represents time, denoted by t=1, 2, …Ti, where Ti is the number of years of annual data a 
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country possesses with a maximum of 51 (see also Table 1). Level 2 refers to the country, 
denoted by  i=1, 2, …44, where 44 is the total number of countries in the sample. Each 
democratization measure, regime stability and the proportion of young persons operate at 
level 1, i.e. time. The three regional dummy variables, i.e. East Europe, Latin America/ 
Caribbean and the U.S., as well as the indicator of prosperity are country-specific 
covariates.  
In the following empirical models the natural logarithm of homicide rates, 
henceforth ln(hti), is a function of time, Fi(t); a set of s (s=1, 2, 3, 4) explanatory country-
level variables, denoted by xqi; l [l=1, 2, 3] year-level variables denoted by xqti; and level 
1 residuals, eti, which are assumed to have a joint normal distribution N(0, Σ). In the 
estimated models below the variance of level 1 residuals, ie. eti, is a quadratic function of 
time, whereby var[e0ti + e1ti (t-t0)] = σ2e0 – 2 σe01 (t-t0) + σ2e1(t-t0)2, (Goldstein et al. 
1998). 
The expected natural logarithm of the homicide rates is given by 
ln(ĥti) =Xtib+Σq=pq=0 uqizqti+Σq=Qq=p+1 uqizqi t=1,…Ti, i=1,...,44 (1) 
where q=0, 1, …, Q, with Q+1 being the total number of random coefficients in the 
model including the intercept and time. Xij is a row vector of K (K≥Q) covariates for the 
ti-th country-year combination, including the intercept, time and possible interactions. b 
is a vector of K estimated coefficients or fixed effects on ln(ĥti).  z0ti=1, z1ti=(t ti -t0),  
zqti=xqti, for q=2, …, p, are the time-country measured characteristics with random effects 
for the ti-th country-year combination. zqi=xqj, for q=p+1,p+2, …, Q, refer to the Q-p≤s 
country-specific covariates with random effects for the i-th country. [uqi]~N(0,Ωu) is the 
random departure from the i-th country (Goldstein, 1995). 
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The estimated models below have been obtained using iterative generalized least 
squares (IGLS) estimation with first order marginal quasi-likelihood (MQL) 
approximation via the software package MLwiN (Goldstein et al., 1998). 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1. General Remarks 
 Tables 3 to 5 present multilevel random effects repeated measures models of 
ln(homicide rates) over selected democracy indicators controlling for population profile, 
country’s prosperity, regional idiosyncrasies and regime stability. Apart from a baseline 
model, whereby ln(hti) is only a function of time, Table 3 gives the effects of the 
composite democracy and polity indicators. Tables 4 and 5 present the effects of the 
individual democracy indicators. In total apart from the baseline seven models are 
discussed in this paper.  
Deviance statistics, which are effectively Wald tests following χ2 theoretical 
distributions (Greene, 1997), for each set of covariates, i.e. each democracy measure, 
youth population proportion and country’s prosperity, regional idiosyncracies and any 
interactions with regime stability, with their appropriate degrees of freedom are presented 
under the corresponding set of covariates in Tables 3 to 5. Each set of covariates is highly 
statistically significant in comparison with χ2 theoretical distributions with the respective 
degrees of freedom (see Tables 3 to 5) implying that these explanatory variables and 
controls are important for the prediction of homicide rates. Each estimate, bk (k=0, 1, 
…K), in the later Tables 3 to 5 has an indication of its statistical significance. This is 
based on Wald tests, which are χ2 distributed with one degree of freedom. 
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In the empirical models below (see Tables 3 to 5) each set of covariates, namely the 
democracy indicators and control variables, as well as any random variation of their 
individual components has been incrementally added to the baseline model. Any random 
variation of each covariate was compared with χ2 theoretical distributions with the 
respective degrees of freedom8. The respective Deviance statistics for each set of 
estimated random variances-covariances are displayed in the rows immediately following 
them in Tables 3 to 5. At least one category of each democracy indicator significantly 
affects the between countries random variation of predicted homicide rates except for 
openness of executive recruitment (see second part of Tables 3 to 5). In Tables 3 to 5 the 
estimated parameters of the random part of each model, i.e. variances-covariances, are 
presented together with their standard deviations, the latter in brackets. Deviance 
statistics for total fixed or random effects at each level, i.e. between or within countries, 
are also displayed. 
Each estimated coefficient, bk (k=0, 1, …K), gives, in general, the change in the 
predicted dependent variable, ln(ĥti), due to a unit increase in the respective covariate. 
Most covariates in this study are binary or nominal thereby bk reflects the change in the 
predicted dependent variable, ln(ĥti), due to the respective characteristic as opposed to the 
reference characteristic or base (see above discussion on democratisation measures and 
Table 2). The dependent variable of this study is the natural logarithm of homicide rates. 
Therefore the exponent of each estimated coefficient, i.e. exp(bk), gives the multiplicative 
effect on predicted homicide rates due to a unit increase of the respective (quantitative) 
covariate or due to assuming the respective characteristic rather than the reference one. 
For instance, according to the Democracy model (third column of Table 3) transition to 
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democracy increases homicide rates by 0.833 [calculated as exp(0.606)-1] compared to 
autocracy, the base. In general exp(bk) greater than one implies rising homicide rates 
whereas exp(bk) less than one implies falling rates. Note that the slopes reported in this 
discussion are inflated by 0.01 due to the logarithmic transformation of (zero) raw 
homicide rates (see section 3.1). 
Each coefficient, which has significant random between countries variation, gives the 
average effect of the respective covariate on homicide rates over the number of countries 
in the sample. This effect is assumed to be normally distributed with mean the estimated 
coefficient and standard deviation given by the square root of the respective estimated 
variance (see also section 4). For instance, 95% of the countries would experience a 
multiplicative effect on homicide rates between 0.674 and 4.983 or changing rates by –
0.326 and 3.983 [calculated as exp{[0.606-2(0.5)]-1} and exp{[0.606+2(0.5)]-1} 
respectively] during transition to democracy.  
Between countries covariances of time-country characteristics imply that the 
respective coefficients are correlated (Goldstein 1995). A negative covariance between, 
say, transition and time would have implied that for countries with less than average (i.e. 
less than the respective estimated coefficient) annual rise of homicide rates transition to 
democracy would increase homicide rates more than average and vice versa. Positive 
covariances imply that any deviations from the respective estimated coefficients are of 
the same direction for the respective co-varing effects. The estimated coefficients and 
random variances-covariances of democracy indicators and control variables on homicide 
rates are discussed in the subsection after next. 
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Table 3 about here 
 
5.2. The baseline model  
A baseline random effects model, whereby ln(homicide rate) is only a function of 
time, was initially fitted. Its results are presented in the second column of Table 3. The 
natural logarithm of homicide rates is a linear function of time9, namely Fi(t)=g0i+g1i(t-
t0), where t0 =1975, the centre of the time series, and i=1,...,44. Alternatively homicide 
rates are an exponential function of time, i.e.  
ĥti = exp [Fi(t)] = exp(g0i) exp[(g1i) (t-t0)]   t=1,…Ti, i=1,...,44 (2) 
where uji=gji-bj0, j=0,1, are random departures from the i-th country, which are normally 
distributed, i.e. N(0,Ωu) (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Therefore,  
ĥti = exp(b00) exp[(b10) (t-t0)] exp(u0i) exp[(u1i) (t-t0)],  t=1,…Ti, i=1,...,44 (3) 
The estimated average homicide rate over the 44 countries of our sample in 1975 
(when t-t0=0) is 2.20 [calculated as exp(0.788)] with a standard deviation of 1.199 [i.e. 
√(1.253+0.184)], when only time affects homicides rates.  
Time exhibits significant fixed, albeit of low magnitude, effect and between countries 
(i.e. level 2) or between years (i.e. level 1) random variation as indicated by the 
respective p-value (less than 0.005) and Deviance statistics (16.936 and 52.027, 
respectively). Homicide rates increased very slowly, i.e. on average by 1.007 
[exp(0.007)], per year with a standard deviation of 0.017 (√0.0003). This implies that in 
95% of the countries ln(hti) changed between -0.027 [i.e. 0.007-2(0.017)] and 0.041 [i.e. 
0.007+2(0.017)] per year during the second half of the 20th century. Alternatively 95% of 
the countries experienced annual changes in homicide rates between -0.027 [i.e. exp(-
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0.027)-1] and 0.042 [exp(0.041)-1]. This result agrees with the picture of low exponential 
growth of average homicide rates for most part of the 20th century (see Figure 1).  
The between countries slope-intercept covariance is not statistically significant and so 
no relationship between a country’s initial homicide rate and its subsequent fluctuation is 
implied. The between years estimated variance of ln(hti) is a quadratic function time, 
whereby ^var[e0ti + e1ti (t-t0)] = [0.184 – 0.0048 (t-t0) + 0.0002 (t-t0)2]. It implies that in 
1987 the between years estimated variance of homicide rates attained its lowest value 
while since that year homicide rates vary increasingly over time. The significant 
estimated fixed and random effects of democracy indicators and control variables on 
homicide rates are discussed henceforth. 
 
5.3. Estimated Effects 
Composite Democracy Indicators 
The third column of Table 3 presents the estimated multilevel repeated measures 
model of homicide rates over the composite democracy indicator and control variables. 
The intercept implies that in 1975 the average expected ln(hti) for a hypothetical country 
(apart from the US, East Europe or Latin America/Caribbean) of average percentage of 
population 15-24 year old and prosperity under autocracy are –0.162 with a standard 
deviation of 0.737 [calculated as √(0.566+0.171)]. The intercept however is not 
statistically significant (while its random variation is) essentially implying unit [exp(0)] 
homicide rates in 1975. If this fictitious country came from East Europe or Latin 
America/Caribbean it would have had respective average homicide rates of 3.396 and 
2.092 [calculated as exp(1.358-0.162) and exp(0.900-0.162) respectively]10. As already 
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seen in Table 1 the East Europe effect is overwhelmingly due to Estonia11. Had the US 
the sample average proportion of youth population and prosperity its 1975 homicide rates 
would have been 4.919 [calculated as exp(1.755-0.162)]. The U.S. effect is effectively an 
interaction between this country and democratic regime (Table 3) or its constituent 
components (see later Tables 4 and 5), since according to each democracy indicator of 
this study the U.S. has been a fully democratic regime during the entire second part of the 
20th century.  
As mentioned, the democracy indicator and its individual categories are highly 
statistically significant as well as exhibit significant random between countries variation 
according to the respective Deviance statistics and p-values. In comparison with 
autocracy transition to democracy increases homicide rates on average by 0.834 whereas 
immediate transform to democracy by 0.395. The respective standard deviations of the 
effects on ln(hti) are 0.500 and 0.294 [calculated as √0.250 and √0.087, respectively].  
The average annual change of homicide rates is 0.004 with a small but statistically 
significant between countries variance. The time-transition to democracy positive 
covariance implies that for countries with higher (lower) than average homicide rates’ 
annual increase the effect of transition is also higher (lower) than average. During 
democracy homicide rates rise by an additional 0.007 [calculated as exp(0.007)-1] per 
year, while during transition homicide rates do not increase any different than due to the 
average time effect.  
The negative intercept covariance with each category of the composite democracy 
indicator, i.e. transition and democratic regime, implies the following. Should the 
countries, which during autocracy had lower (higher) than average homicide rates, move 
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away from autocracy they would experience higher (lower) than average increases of 
homicide rates. Put it plainly, the effect of transition or democracy on ln(hti) for these 
countries would be higher (lower) than the respective fixed effects (i.e. 0.834 and 0.395, 
respectively).  
According to the highly significant effects of the control variables homicide rates are 
expected to increase by 20.92 per 10,000 due to one percent rise of population 15-24 year 
old whereas they would drop by 0.059 when prosperity rises by a unit.  
The last column of Table 3 gives the estimated effects of polity, which accounts for 
levels of autocracy as well as democracy, and control variables on homicide rates. The 
basis or reference category here is “rather autocratic regime” which to some extent differs 
from the basis of the earlier composite democracy indicator12. “Rather democratic 
regime” increases homicide rates by 0.543 [calculated as exp(0.434)-1] when contrasted 
with “rather autocratic regime”. This effect varied between countries with a standard 
deviation of 0.400. By contrast fully democratic regime does not have a significant mean 
effect on homicide rates13 but exhibits significant between countries variation with a 
standard deviation of 0.635. Thus regime change from “rather autocracy” to established 
democracy may alter homicide rates both negatively or positively depending entirely on 
the country. In particular homicide rates are expected to change by between –0.701 
[calculated as {exp[0.061-2*(0.635)]-1}] and 2.785 [calculated as {exp[-
0.061+2*(0.635)]-1}] in the hypothetical case that a “rather autocratic regime” instantly 
changes to democracy.  
The negative intercept covariances of “rather” or fully democratic regimes are 
interpreted as before. They imply that the higher (lower) the homicide rates for a “rather 
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autocratic” regime the lower (higher) the effect of “rather” or fully democratic regimes 
on a country’s homicide rates. During “rather” or fully democratic regimes homicide 
rates increase annually by 0.009, according to interaction effects whereas the mean effect 
of time is not individually significant. The estimated effects of the percentage of young 
population, prosperity and regional idiosyncracies on homicide rates in the polity model 
differ marginally from the ones discussed earlier (i.e. in the democracy model). 
Finally the estimated parameters of the quadratic function of time of the between 
years (level 1) variance of homicide rates are essentially unaltered in the models for 
democracy and polity compared to the baseline one. We now turn to the discussion of the 
effects of the individual democracy indicators on homicide growth rates.  
 
Competitiveness of Participation, Executive Recruitment Competition and 
Constraints 
Table 4 presents the estimated fixed and random effects of three individual 
democracy indicators, i.e. competitiveness of participation, executive recruitment 
competition and executive constraints, on ln(hti). Apart from the first, each column of 
Table 4 gives the estimated parameters and related statistical tests of these effects of each 
indicator as well as young population proportion, prosperity and regional idiosyncracies. 
Executive constraints, competitiveness of participation and executive recruitment 
competition significantly affect homicide rates (in this order) according to the respective 
Deviance tests.  
Table 4 about here 
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The expected average homicide rate of the fictitious country of reference (see first 
paragraph of the estimated effects sub-section) apart from the US, East Europe, and Latin 
America/ Caribbean in 1975 is essentially one had this country unregulated or suppressed 
or restricted transitional competitiveness of participation of non-elites to institutional 
structures for political expression, or unregulated /selective executive recruitment 
competition or unlimited authority of the executive committee. The respective standard 
deviations of the intercept are 0.791, 0.908 and 0.810 [calculated as √(0.452+0.173), 
√(0.653+0.172) and √(0.479+0.177), respectively]. Had this country been the US or in 
East Europe or Latin America /Caribbean its expected average homicide rate would have 
been augmented by the estimated respective parameters for each model in Table 4. For 
instance, the expected average homicide rate of an East European country with unlimited 
authority of the executive committee and all other reference characteristics would have 
been 5.190 [calculated as {exp(-0.060+1.706)}] see last column of Table 4] in 1975. The 
intercept effect is highest for the US and lowest for Latin America/ Caribbean in all three 
models of Table 4. It may be worth repeating here that the US effect is essentially an 
interaction between this country and the most “liberal” category of each democratic 
indicator. 
Improvements of competitiveness of participation, executive recruitment competition 
and executive constraints are associated with increases of homicide rates. In particular 
factional /transitional or competitive participation of non-elites to institutional structures 
for political expression are expected to increase homicide rates by 0.725 and 0.367 
[calculated as exp{(0.545)-1} and exp{(0.313)-1}], respectively, in comparison with 
unregulated or suppressed or restricted transitional participation. Dual /transitional 
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executive recruitment competition or via elections rises them by 0.221 and 0.431 
[calculated as exp{(0.200)-1} and exp{(0.358)-1}], respectively, compared to unregulated 
or via selection executive recruitment competition. Similarly, executive parity or 
subordination rather than unlimited authority accelerates homicide rates by 0.565 
[calculated as exp{(0.448)-1}]. The aforementioned effects of factional /transitional 
competitiveness of participation and executive recruitment via elections on homicide 
rates vary significantly between countries with respective standard deviations of 0.493 
(√0.243) and 0.452 (√0.204). The covariance parameters reported in the second part of 
Table 4 are interpreted as before (see previous sub-section). 
Each year following (preceding) 1975 increases (drops) homicide rates by an average 
minimum of 0.006 (in the executive constraints model) and a maximum of 0.009 (in the 
competitiveness of participation model) with respective standard deviations of 0.014 and 
0.01 [calculated as √0.0002 and √0.0001, respectively]. One per cent rise of the 
population 15-24 years old in a country is associated with between 27.980 (executive 
constraints model) and 31.031 (competitiveness of participation model) increase of  
homicide rates [calculated as exp{(3.367)-1} and exp{(3.467)-1}, respectively] per 
thousand people. One unit rise of Prosperity in a country would drop homicide rates by 
between 0.077 (competitiveness of participation model) and 0.084 (executive constraints 
model) [calculated as exp{(-0.081)-1} and as exp{(-0.087)-1}, respectively].  
 
Regulation of Participation and Openness of Executive Recruitment 
The effects of the last two individual democracy indicators, i.e. regulation of 
participation and openness of executive recruitment, on ln(hti), along with the usual 
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control variables, are given in Table 5 (second and third columns respectively). 
Indications of statistical significance of fixed parameters, standard deviations of random 
parameters and Deviance statistics are also presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 about here 
Had the fictitious reference country (see sub-section 5.3) multiple identity of 
regulation of participation, i.e. fluid political participation or ‘intense, hostile and 
frequently violent’ competition among political groups for political influence (see 
www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity, CodeBook) its expected 1975 homicide rates would have 
been 1.598 per 100,000 people [calculated as exp(0.468)] with a standard deviation of 
0.865 [calculated as √(0.572+0.177), see second column of Table 5]. The expected 1975 
rates of the fictitious country are essentially one in the case of unregulated executive 
recruitment with a standard deviation of 0.769 [calculated as √(0.407+0.184), see last 
column of Table 5]. As in the previous models of Tables 3 and 4, the US, East Europe 
and Latin America /Caribbean countries have, in this order, higher average homicide 
rates.  
Democratising gradually regulation of participation exerts significant negative effects 
on homicide rates, unlike any other democracy process examined in this study. In 
particular, sectarian /restricted or regulated participation decreases rates on average by 
0.185 and 0.155, respectively, [calculated as (exp(-0.205)-1) and (exp(-0.168)-1), 
respectively] when contrasted with multiple identity. These effects vary between 
countries with respective standard deviations of 0.327 and 0.370 [calculated as √0.107 
and √0.137, respectively]. Open executive recruitment, by contrast, is related to 0.270 
 
 32
[calculated as exp(0.239)-1] higher homicide rates than unregulated recruitment and this 
relationship does not vary between countries. 
Time and the proportion of young population affect homicide rates positively whereas 
a country’s prosperity diminishes them, similarly to the models discussed in the previous 
Tables 3 and 4. Finally, the quadratic function of time of the between years variation of 
the homicide rates is essentially identical across the five models of Tables 4 and 5, as 
well as similar to that of the baseline model above (see thus entitled sub-section 5.2).  
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Most support for modernization/social disorganization perspectives:  Both 
modernization and social disorganization perspectives have been widely 
discredited in criminology in the past few decades. OR THE CONFLICT 
THEORY 
2.  
--but part of the difficulty with these perspectives in terms of cross-national comparative 
criminology is that we have lacked the data and methods to adequately test them. 
--although modernization is clearly a longitudinal, processual concept, virtually all of the 
research to date has been cross-sectional. 
 
--Moreover, most studies of cross-national violent crime have been limited to a handful 
of highly industrialized countries;   
--while this study was also skewed toward industrialized countries, we were able to 
include far more data from industrializing countries that is typically  the case in this type 
of research. 
 
3. Major contradiction of modernization theory when it comes to crime;  How do we 
explain examples of relatively high crime rates in countries that are nevertheless, 
highly industrialized liberal democracies? 
 
--prominent examples:  The United States, Finland GARY IT’S DUE TO HIGHER 
HOUSEHOLD GUN OWNERSHIP, SEE TSELONI+BASS 2002 
 
--although most criminological tests of modernization theory have simply examined the 
corss-sectional impact of level of economic development on crime rates, the theoretical 
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baseis of Djurkheim’s arguments about modernization and crime is more broadly rooted 
in the concept of social disorganization. 
 
Compared with industrialized societies, industrializing societies are more likely to 
experience rapid crime increases because of the transition from traditional to modern 
society is associated with a breakdown of the normative order characterized by growing 
social disorganization. 
 
--this raises the possibility that it is not modernization that is driving crime, but social 
disorganization and that while highly modernized countries tend to have low levels of 
social disorganization, this is not always the case. 
GARY I DIASGREE WITH THE UNDERLINED COMMENT: Isn’t it that high 
industrialization also means a) high labour mobility or immigration and b) raised needs 
for imported labour or migration? Thus industrialization is associated with (any empirical 
research evidence?) national & international labour mobility, i.e. uprooting people and 
separating families, which in turn creates social disorganisation.  
 
--similarly, it also means that some countries that score very low on modernization, may 
nevertheless have low levels of social disorganization, and correspondingly low levels of 
crime. 
 
4. During the third wave of democratization among countries of the world, many 
countries have been extremely concerned with alarming increases in rates of 
crime.  
 
--we hear these reports from the emerging democracies of eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union  
GARY isn’t this democratisation closely related to opening the markets for the 
international capital along with destroying the social protection net (see recent changes in 
the social welfare system of Russia and Germany) b/c it’s now deemed to be over-
expensive? This may support the conflict perspective. 
 
--we hear these reports from the fledgling democracies of Latin America 
 
--and we hear these reports from emerging democracies in Africa and Asia 
 
--Our results suggest that this concern about crime in transitional societies are not merely 
alarmist over reactions 
 
--it does appear that crime rates are higher in transitional democracies than in autocratic 
societies. 
 
--but interestingly, the results also suggest that if transitional democracies can continue to 
move toward full democracy, their crime rates will eventually begin to decline; that high 
crime rates are a feature of democracies in transition. 
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SHORTCOMINGS: PROBLEMS WITH DEMOCRACY RATING (we mention the 
example of the US, France and Greece between 1972 and 1978) &  
WHO HOMICIDE DATA. 
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Table 1: Homicide rates per country and range of years  
Countries Total  Years  Homicide rate 
 Years First Last Mean Stdev. Min Max 
Australia  50 1950 1999 1.70 0.26 1.04 2.39
Austria  51 1950 2000 1.23 0.23 0.84 1.77
Belgium  43 1954 1996 1.19 0.46 0.57 2.15
Bulgaria 41 1960 2000 2.95 0.99 0.80 5.07
Canada  49 1950 1998 1.80 0.52 0.99 2.70
Chile  44 1954 1999 3.32 1.23 1.75 6.60
Colombia  28 1951 1994 37.36 22.15 14.45 89.50
Costa Rica  46 1955 2000 4.28 1.15 2.39 8.35
Czechoslovakia - 
Czech Republic 
48 1953 2000 1.35 0.32 0.88 2.27
Denmark  49 1950 1998 0.89 0.32 0.39 1.45
Dominican Republic  25 1956 1985 5.05 1.64 2.08 9.38
El Salvador  24 1950 1993 33.86 6.63 24.31 51.53
Estonia 8 1991 1998 20.11 5.44 10.79 28.22
Finland    51 1950 2000 2.81 0.43 1.82 3.63
France  44 1950 1999 0.95 0.16 0.70 1.32
Germany 50 1950 1999 1.12 0.13 0.86 1.39
Greece  43 1956 1998 1.06 0.43 0.51 2.74
Hungary  45 1955 2000 2.54 0.70 1.56 4.09
Iceland 48 1950 1997 0.79 0.76 0.00 3.31
Ireland  50 1950 1999 0.60 0.32 0.18 2.00
Israel  40 1954 1998 1.27 0.60 0.12 2.43
Italy  50 1950 1999 1.49 0.45 0.81 2.84
Japan  50 1950 1999 1.28 0.55 0.55 2.37
Luxemburg 33 1967 2000 1.36 0.72 0.25 2.91
Mauritius  33 1968 2000 2.05 1.05 0.61 6.10
Mexico  39 1958 2000 18.88 4.97 9.78 32.28
Netherlands  50 1950 1999 0.74 0.34 0.21 1.36
New Zealand  50 1950 1999 1.28 0.54 0.00 2.40
Norway  50 1950 1999 0.78 0.34 0.26 1.56
Panama  34 1954 1987 4.14 1.63 1.73 7.24
Paraguay 18 1969 1987 11.71 3.56 6.54 16.60
Philippines 20 1957 1981 6.20 5.59 0.38 17.40
Poland  41 1955 2000 1.55 0.65 0.83 2.94
Portugal  48 1950 2000 1.29 0.29 0.73 1.88
Singapore  42 1959 2000 1.76 0.53 0.57 3.02
Spain  49 1950 1999 0.62 0.34 0.06 1.18
Sweden  50 1950 1999 1.01 0.28 0.56 1.50
Switzerland  50 1950 1999 1.04 0.38 0.54 2.84
Thailand 33 1955 1994 15.39 5.73 6.71 28.77
Trinidad and Tobago 30 1962 1994 6.09 2.30 2.10 11.43
United Kingdom  51 1950 2000 0.84 0.25 0.51 1.52
United States  50 1950 1999 7.51 2.12 4.50 10.55
Uruguay 32 1955 1990 3.81 1.00 1.99 5.68
Venezuela  47 1950 2000 9.75 3.62 5.02 26.35
All Countries 51 1950 2000 3.91 7.40 0.00 89.50
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Table 2: Description of Variables  
 
DEMOCRACY INDICATORS Frequency (%)  
Composite Democracy Variable a  
Autocratic Regime (base) 17.1 
Transition (in between values) 24.1 
Fully Democratic Regime  58.8 
Composite Polity Variable (=Democracy-Autocracy) a  
   Rather Autocratic Regime (base, incl. Occupation) 21.7 
Rather Democratic Regime 19.7 
Fully Democratic Regime  58.8 
Competitiveness of Participation a  
Unregulated/Suppressed/Restricted Transitional (base) 19.7 
Factional/Transitional 16.5 
Competitive  63.8 
Executive Recruitment Competition a  
Unregulated/Selection (base) 20.2 
Dual/Transitional 5.6 
Election  74.2 
Executive Constraints a  
Unlimited authority (base) 7.8 
Intermediate categories  25.8 
Executive parity or Subordination  66.4 
Regulation of Participation a  
Multiple identity (base) 12.1 
Sectarian or restricted  24.0 
Regulated 63.9 
Openness of Executive Recruitment a  
Unregulated (base) 5.0 
Open 95.0 
CONTROL VARIABLES    
East Europe 10.0 
Latin America/ Caribbean 20.1 
U.S. 2.7 
Mean Std. Dev. Min/Max
Ln{GDP per capita (mean per country)} e 8.39 0.63 6.60/ 9.52
Gini coefficient (mean per country) c 35.56 8.03 22.25/ 55.28
Prosperity (country level) d  0.00 7.85 -18.61/ 12.54
Percent population 15 to 24 years old b 0.16 0.03 0.11/ 0.24
Years (since 1950) of Regime Stability a 19.19 14.19 0/ 51
 
a Gurr data set, www.cidcm.umd.edu;  
b World Health Organisation. 1998 “World Health Statistics” Geneva, Switzerland: WHO;  
c Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn. 1999. “Measuring Income Inequality: A New Database”. The 
World Bank Group. Professor Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson has kindly forwarded Gini coefficients 
for Iceland;  
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d Composite variable calculated as {0.926[Ln(GDP per capita)- Gini]} at centred values;  
e OECD,  www.oecd.org. 
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Table 3: Estimated multilevel effects of composite democracy indicators on the natural 
logarithm of national homicide rates during the second half of the 20th century across the 
world. 
 
 Baseline Model Democracy  Polity  
Estimated Coefficients  
Time (centred) 0.0075# 0.0041** 0.0015
   
Democracy Indicator (base: Autocratic Regime)  -
 Transition 0.6063# 
 Democratic Regime 0.3326# 
Deviance (d.f.=2) 28.4359 
  
Polity Indicator (base: Rather Autocratic Regime) - 
 Rather Democratic Regime  0.4343#
 Democratic Regime  0.0610
Deviance (d.f.=2)  17.3135
  
Interactions with Regime Stability since 1950  
Transition x Regime Stability 0.0046 -
Democratic Regime x Regime Stability 0.0070* -
Rather Democratic Regime x Regime Stability - 0.0089~
Democratic Regime x Regime Stability - 0.0093#
Deviance (d.f.=2) 6.0555 11.7929
  
Controls  
Percent population 15 to 24 years old  3.0874# 3.1266#
Prosperity -0.0605# -0.0447*
Deviance (d.f.=2) 31.0076 25.7742
East Europe 1.3850# 1.3951#
Latin America/ Caribbean 0.9004** 1.0345#
U.S. 1.7555# 1.8118#
Deviance (d.f.=3) 41.1151 49.7794
  
Total Deviance for all estimated 
parameters (d.f.) 6.8203 (1)
 
156.1102 (10) 151.0956 (10)
  
Intercept  0.7879#  -0.1624 -0.0075
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations.  
d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
# p-value<0.005, ** 0.005<=p-value<0.01, * 0.01<=p-value<0.05, ~0.05<=p-value<0.10.  
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Table 3: Estimated multilevel effects of composite democracy indicators on the natural 
logarithm of national homicide rates during the second half of the 20th century across the 
world (continued). 
 
 Baseline Model Democracy  Polity  
Estimated Random Variances-Covariances  
Random Variances-Covariances between Countries 
σ2 0 (S.E.) 1.2535 (0.2692) 0.5660 (0.1413) 0.6964 (0.1837)
σ 0 time (S.E.) -0.0048 (0.0033) -0.0018 (0.0012) -0.0017 (0.0010)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0003 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 16.9360 12.1104 10.5895
σ 0 transition (S.E.) - -0.1616 (0.0698) -
σ time transition (S.E.) - 0.0052 (0.0016) -
σ2 transition (S.E.) - 0.2497 (0.0873) -
Deviance (d.f.=3) 12.3213 
σ 0 democratic regime (S.E.) - -0.1923 (0.0828) -
σ2 democratic regime (S.E.) - 0.0867 (0.0563) -
Deviance (d.f.=2) 5.6693 
σ 0 rather democratic regime (S.E.) - - -0.1179 (0.0601)
σ2 rather democratic regime  (S.E.) - - 0.1597 (0.0680)
Deviance (d.f.=2)  6.1315
σ 0 democratic regime (S.E.) - - -0.4395 (0.1601)
σ2 democratic regime  (S.E.) - - 0.4027 (0.1786)
Deviance (d.f.=2)  7.7119
  
Total Deviance for between 
countries variance-covariance 
matrix (d.f.) 38.5370 (3)
 
 
38.1471 (8) 39.8276 (7)
  
Random Variances-Covariances between Years 
σ2 0 (S.E.) 0.1838 (0.0094) 0.1709 (0.0088) 0.1685 (0.0089)
σ 0 time (S.E.) -0.0024 (0.0003) -0.0021 (0.0003) -0.0020 (0.0003)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0001)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 52.0273 47.5252 47.7633
  
Total Deviance for between 
years variance-covariance 
matrix (d.f.=3) 869.9456
 
 
861.8876 858.4745
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations.  
d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
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Table 4: Estimated multilevel effects of individual democracy indicators on the natural 
logarithm of national homicide rates during the second half of the 20th century across the 
world [1].  
 
 Competitive-
ness of 
Participation 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Competition 
Executive 
Constraints 
Estimated Coefficients 
Time (centred) 0.0090# 0.0083# 0.0063*
 
Competitiveness of Participation  
(base: Unreg./ Suppr./ Restr. Transitional) - -
 Factional/ Transitional 0.5450#
 Competitive 0.3126#
Deviance (d.f.=2) 31.5000
  
Executive Recruitment Competition 
(base: Unregulated/ Selection) -
 
-
 Dual/Transitional 0.1996*
 Election 0.3582#
Deviance (d.f.=2) 13.0564
 
Executive Constraints  
(base: Unlimited Authority) -
 
-
 Intermediate categories 0.1020
0.4479# Executive Parity or Subordination 
Deviance (d.f.=2) 35.6429
 
Controls 
Percent population 15 to 24 years old  3.4667# 3.4412# 3.3666#
Prosperity -0.0806# -0.0823# -0.0875#
Deviance (d.f.=2) 42.7411 43.3872 41.5016
East Europe 1.4765# 1.5434# 1.7065#
Latin America/ Caribbean 0.6079~ 0.6414~ 0.7629*
U.S. 1.7949** 1.7239# 1.6946*
Deviance (d.f.=3) 29.6649 66.7984 34.3770
 
Total Deviance for all estimated 
parameters (d.f.) 156.3229 (8) 145.8184 (8) 146.1843 (8)
 
 Intercept  0.0386 0.0449  -0.0597
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations.  
d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
# p-value<0.005, ** 0.005<=p-value<0.01, * 0.01<=p-value<0.05, ~ 0.0552=p-value<0.10. 
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Table 4: Estimated effects of individual democracy indicators on the natural logarithm of 
national homicide rates during the second half of the 20th century across the world [1] 
(continued). 
 
 Competitive-ness 
of Participation 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Competition 
Executive 
Constraints 
Estimated Variances-Covariances 
Random Variances-Covariances between Countries   
σ02 (S.E.) 0.4519 (0.1007) 0.6533 (0.1858) 0.4787 (0.1059)
σ 0 time  (S.E.) -0.0019 (0.0015) -0.0010 (0.0013)  0.0005 (0.0018)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0001)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 13.3663 12.6237 15.9954
σ 0 factional/ transitional  (S.E.) -0.1663 (0.0800) - -
σ time factional/ transitional (S.E.)  0.0048 (0.0017) - -
σ2 factional/ transitional  (S.E.) 0.2433 (0.0928) - -
Deviance (d.f.=3) 9.3407
σ 0 election (S.E.) - -0.2577 (0.1140) -
σ2election (S.E.) - 0.2043 (0.0858) -
Deviance (d.f.=2) 6.0473
σ 0 intermediate (S.E.) - - -0.0442 (0.0438)
σ time intermediate (S.E.) - - -0.0026 (0.0011)
σ2intermediate  (S.E.) - - 0.0327 (0.0250)
Deviance (d.f.=3) 6.6149
 
Total Deviance for between 
countries variance-
covariance matrix (d.f.) 37.9671 (6) 38.9347 (5) 37.8991 (6)
 
Random Variances-Covariances between Years 
σ02 (S.E.) 0.1735 (0.0089) 0.1717 (0.0089) 0.1771 (0.0091)
σ 0 time (S.E.) -0.0022 (0.0003) -0.0022 (0.0003) -0.0022 (0.0003)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0000)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 49.1819 50.3286  50.1897
 
Total Deviance for between 
years variance-covariance 
matrix (d.f.=3) 864.3272
 
862.9291 864.2292
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations.  
d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5: Estimated multilevel effects of individual democracy indicators on the natural 
logarithm of national homicide rates during the second half of the 20th century across the 
world [2].  
 
 Regulation of 
Participation 
Openness of 
Executive 
Recruitment  
Estimated Coefficients 
Time (centred) 0.0058* 0.0077**
 
Regulation of Participation (base: Multiple Identity)  -
 Sectarian/ Restricted -0.2052*
 Regulated -0.1680~
Deviance (d.f.=2)  5.7912
  
Openness of Executive Recruitment (base: 
Unregulated) -
 
0.2393# Open 
Deviance (d.f.=1) 12.7609
 
Controls 
Percent population 15 to 24 years old  3.1457# 3.3305#
Prosperity -0.0504# -0.0755#
Deviance (d.f.=2) 28.3866 37.2637
East Europe 1.1878# 1.3388#
Latin America/ Caribbean 1.0140# 0.8388*
U.S. 1.8457# 1.7657**
Deviance (d.f.=3) 47.7239 29.5360
 
Total Deviance for all estimated parameters (d.f.) 128.8822 (8) 132.9383 (7)
 
 Intercept  0.4685# 0.0603
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations.  
d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
# p-value<0.005, ** 0.005<=p-value<0.01, * 0.01<=p-value<0.05, ~ 0.0554=p-value<0.10. 
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Table 5: Estimated effects of individual democracy indicators on the natural logarithm of 
national homicide rates during the second half of the 20th century across the world [2] 
(continued). 
 
 Regulation of 
Participation 
Openness of 
Executive 
Recruitment  
Estimated Variances-Covariances 
Random Variances-Covariances between Countries  
σ02 (S.E.) 0.5716 (0.1456) 0.4075 (0.0885)
σ 0 time  (S.E.)  0.0013 (0.0025)  0.0012 (0.0019)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0003 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0001)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 15.8721 16.9621
σ 0 sectarian/ restricted  (S.E.) -0.0301 (0.0498) -
σ2 sectarian/ restricted  (S.E.) 0.1070 (0.0557) -
Deviance (d.f.=2) 4.0496
σ 0 regulated  (S.E.) -0.2198 (0.0865) -
σ time regulated (S.E.) -0.0047 (0.0020) -
σ2 regulated (S.E.) 0.1368 (0.0646) -
Deviance (d.f.=3) 15.0607
Total Deviance for between countries variance-
covariance matrix (d.f.) 41.2650 (8) 38.1819 (3)
 
Random Variances-Covariances between Years 
σ02 (S.E.) 0.1771 (0.0091) 0.1840 (0.0093)
σ 0 time (S.E.) -0.0023 (0.0003) -0.0024 (0.0003)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0000)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 52.0416 52.0698
 
Total Deviance for between years variance-
covariance matrix (d.f.=3) 860.4821 870.1646
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations.  
d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
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1 Skewness of the distribution of ln(homicide rate) is considerably lower (0.34) than that 
of the original distribution of homicide rates (5.21). Similarly taking the natural 
logarithms of the raw homicide rates decreased kurtosis from 39.75 to 3.03. Thus the 
distribution of the transformed series, i.e. ln(homicide rate), approaches the Gaussian. 
2 Four data points, which denote foreign occupation of the respective country, have been 
subsumed in the ‘rather autocratic regime’ reference group. 
3 Principal components analysis is standard remedie for the problem of highly collinear 
regressors (Green 1997). 
4 Data from the Sinai campaign (1956, 1957) for Israel are excluded due to missing 
observations of youth population proportion.  
5 The modelling results including the dummy variables of “historic events” are available 
to interested readers upon request. 
6 Alternatively this method is called ‘hierarchical linear model approach to repeated 
measures’ (Snijders and Bosker 1999, page 166). The main advantage of the multilevel 
approach (as opposed, for instance, to panel data analysis) is that it can deal with 
unbalanced or incomplete data structures (Snijders and Bosker 1999). 
7 Random variance of the intercept at a higher level of aggregation, region (classified as 
north-west Europe, south-west Europe, east Europe, north America, Latin America & the 
Caribbean, Asia, Oceania, Israel, and Mauritius), was statistically non significant 
according to Deviance test with one degree of freedom. These results are available to 
interested readers upon request. 
8 The p-values for the Wald tests or Devince for random parameters have been corrected 
to account for one-tail tests (Snijders and Bosker, 1999, page 90). Random effects, which 
jointly showed p-value greater than 0.10, were removed from the models and less 
complex variation was fitted, for instance, constraining any non-significant covariance to 
zero except the intercept covariance, which has been kept regardless its statistical 
significance (Snijders and Bosker 1999). If the joint X2 distribution had a p-value equal to 
or less than 0.10 the variance and all covariance terms of the random effect have been 
kept in the final models.  
9 A quadratic term of time, i.e. (t-t0)2, was also fitted but showed no statistically 
significant fixed or random effects. 
10 The regional dummy variables of East Europe and Latin America /Caribbean do not 
affect the slope of the relationship between homicide rates and democracy only its 
position. In other words interaction effects between each of these dummy variables and 
each democracy indicator, which were fitted in a preliminary analysis, were essentially 
zero. Similarly income inequality was not found to interact with democracy in affecting 
homicide rates. 
11 Indeed the effect of Estonia on homicide growth rates was found to be 2.26 in an 
estimated model, which differed from the one presented here by including a dummy 
variable for this country rather than the entire East Europe. 
12 Ninety-four (94) country-year points (i.e. 5.1% of the total sample) are classified into 
“rather autocratic regime” of the polity indicator whereas they belong to the middle 
category of transition of the composite democracy indicator. By contrast “rather 
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autocratic regime” excludes 13 (0.7%) country-year data points, which are classified into 
autocratic regime of the democracy indicator.  
13 In a preliminary model with only fixed effects of the composite polity indicator the 
estimated democracy effect was 0.3951 and highly significant (standard deviation 0.067). 
Allowing for random variation showed that the effect of democracy compared to rather 
autocratic regime is highly inconsistent between countries. 
 
Table 1: Homicide rates per country and range of years  
Countries Years Frst Last Mean Stdev Min Max 
Australia  50 ‘50 ‘99 1.70 0.26 1.04 2.39
Austria  51 ‘50 ‘00 1.23 0.23 0.84 1.77
Belgium  43 ‘54 ‘96 1.19 0.46 0.57 2.15
Bulgaria 41 ‘60 ‘00 2.95 0.99 0.80 5.07
Canada  49 ‘50 ‘98 1.80 0.52 0.99 2.70
Chile  44 ‘54 ‘99 3.32 1.23 1.75 6.60
Colombia  28 ‘51 ‘94 37.36 22.15 14.45 89.50
Costa Rica  46 ‘55 ‘00 4.28 1.15 2.39 8.35
Czechosl.CzechR 48 ‘53 ‘00 1.35 0.32 0.88 2.27
Denmark  49 ‘50 ‘98 0.89 0.32 0.39 1.45
Dominican Rep. 25 ‘56 ‘85 5.05 1.64 2.08 9.38
El Salvador  24 ‘50 ‘93 33.86 6.63 24.31 51.53
Estonia 8 ‘91 ‘98 20.11 5.44 10.79 28.22
Finland    51 ‘50 ‘00 2.81 0.43 1.82 3.63
France  44 ‘50 ‘99 0.95 0.16 0.70 1.32
Germany 50 ‘50 ‘99 1.12 0.13 0.86 1.39
Greece  43 ‘56 ‘98 1.06 0.43 0.51 2.74
Hungary  45 ‘55 ‘00 2.54 0.70 1.56 4.09
Iceland 48 ‘50 ‘97 0.79 0.76 0.00 3.31
Ireland  50 ‘50 ‘99 0.60 0.32 0.18 2.00
Israel  40 ‘54 ‘98 1.27 0.60 0.12 2.43
Italy  50 ‘50 ‘99 1.49 0.45 0.81 2.84
Japan  50 ‘50 ‘99 1.28 0.55 0.55 2.37
Luxemburg 33 ‘67 ‘00 1.36 0.72 0.25 2.91
Mauritius  33 ‘68 ‘00 2.05 1.05 0.61 6.10
Mexico  39 ‘58 ‘00 18.88 4.97 9.78 32.28
Netherlands  50 ‘50 ‘99 0.74 0.34 0.21 1.36
New Zealand  50 ‘50 ‘99 1.28 0.54 0.00 2.40
Norway  50 ‘50 ‘99 0.78 0.34 0.26 1.56
Panama  34 ‘54 ‘87 4.14 1.63 1.73 7.24
Paraguay 18 ‘69 ‘87 11.71 3.56 6.54 16.60
Philippines 20 ‘57 ‘81 6.20 5.59 0.38 17.40
Poland  41 ‘55 ‘00 1.55 0.65 0.83 2.94
Portugal  48 ‘50 ‘00 1.29 0.29 0.73 1.88
Singapore  42 ‘59 ‘00 1.76 0.53 0.57 3.02
Spain  49 ‘50 ‘99 0.62 0.34 0.06 1.18
Sweden  50 ‘50 ‘99 1.01 0.28 0.56 1.50
Switzerland  50 ‘50 ‘99 1.04 0.38 0.54 2.84
Thailand 33 ‘55 ‘94 15.39 5.73 6.71 28.77
Trinidad&Tobago 30 ‘62 ‘94 6.09 2.30 2.10 11.43
United Kingdom  51 ‘50 ‘00 0.84 0.25 0.51 1.52
United States  50 ‘50 ‘99 7.51 2.12 4.50 10.55
Uruguay 32 ‘55 ‘90 3.81 1.00 1.99 5.68
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Venezuela  47 ‘50 ‘00 9.75 3.62 5.02 26.35
All Countries 51 ‘50 ‘00 3.91 7.40 0.00 89.50
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Table 2: Description of Democracy Indicators and Controls  
Composite Democracy Variable a % 
Autocratic Regime (base) 17.1 
Transition (in between values) 24.1 
Fully Democratic Regime  58.8 
Composite Polity Variable (=Democracy-Autocracy) a  
Rather Autocratic Regime (base, incl. Foreign Occ.) 21.7 
Rather Democratic Regime 19.7 
Fully Democratic Regime  58.8 
Competitiveness of Participation a  
Unregulated/Suppressed/Restricted Transitional (base) 19.7 
Factional/Transitional 16.5 
Competitive  63.8 
Executive Recruitment Competition a  
Unregulated/Selection (base) 20.2 
Dual/Transitional 5.6 
Election  74.2 
Executive Constraints a  
Unlimited authority (base) 7.8 
Intermediate categories  25.8 
Executive parity or Subordination  66.4 
Regulation of Participation a  
Multiple identity (base) 12.1 
Sectarian or restricted  24.0 
Regulated 63.9 
Openness of Executive Recruitment a  
Unregulated (base) 5.0 
Open 95.0 
CONTROL VARIABLES    
East Europe 10.0 
Latin America/ Caribbean 20.1 
U.S. 2.7 
Mean StdD. Min/Max
Ln{GDP per capita (mean per country)} e 8.39 0.63 6.60/ 9.52
Gini coefficient (mean per country) c 35.56 8.03 22.25/ 55.28
Prosperity (country level) d  0.00 7.85 -18.61/ 12.54
Percent population 15 to 24 years old b 0.16 0.03 0.11/ 0.24
Years (since 1950) of Regime Stability a 19.19 14.19 0/ 51
d Composite variable calculated as {0.926[Ln(GDP per capita)- Gini]} at centred values. 
a Gurr data set, www.cidcm.umd.edu; b WHO; c Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn. 1999. The 
World Bank Group. Professor Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson: Gini coefficients for Iceland;  
e OECD, www.oecd.org. 
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Table 3: Estimated multilevel effects of composite democracy indicators on 
national homicide rates (ln) during the second half of the 20th century. 
 
 Baseline Democracy  Polity  
Estimated Coefficients  
Time (centred) 0.0075# 0.0041** 0.0015
   
Democracy Indicator (base: Autocratic Regime) 
 Transition 0.6063# 
 Democratic Regime 0.3326# 
Deviance (d.f.=2) 28.4359 
  
Polity Indicator (base: Rather Autocratic Regime) 
 Rather Democratic Regime  0.4343#
 Democratic Regime  0.0610
Deviance (d.f.=2)  17.3135
  
Interactions with Regime Stability since 1950 
 Transition x Regime Stability 0.0046 
 Democratic Regime x Regime Stability 0.0070* 
 Rather Democratic Regime x Regime Stability 0.0089~
 Democratic Regime x Regime Stability  0.0093#
Deviance (d.f.=2) 6.0555 11.7929
  
Controls  
Percent population 15 to 24 years old  3.0874# 3.1266#
Prosperity -0.0605# -0.0447*
Deviance (d.f.=2) 31.0076 25.7742
East Europe 1.3850# 1.3951#
Latin America/ Caribbean 0.9004** 1.0345#
U.S. 1.7555# 1.8118#
Deviance (d.f.=3) 41.1151 49.7794
  
Total Deviance for all 
estimated parameters (d.f.) 6.8203 (1)
 
156.1102 (10) 151.0956 (10)
  
Intercept  0.7879#  -0.1624 -0.0075
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations; d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
# p-value<0.005, ** 0.005<=p-value<0.01, * 0.01<=p-value<0.05, ~0.05<=p-value<0.10.  
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Table 3: Estimated multilevel effects of composite democracy indicators on 
national homicide rates (ln) during the second half of the 20th century (ctnd). 
 
 Baseline Democracy  Polity  
Estimated Random Variances-Covariances  
Random Variances-Covariances between Countries 
σ2 0 (S.E.) 1.2535 (0.2692) 0.5660 (0.1413) 0.6964 (0.1837)
σ 0 time (S.E.) -0.0048 (0.0033) -0.0018 (0.0012) -0.0017 (0.0010)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0003 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 16.9360 12.1104 10.5895
σ 0 transition (S.E.) -0.1616 (0.0698) 
σ time transition (S.E.) 0.0052 (0.0016) 
σ2 transition (S.E.) 0.2497 (0.0873)              
Deviance (d.f.=3) 12.3213 
σ 0 democratic regime (S.E.) -0.1923 (0.0828) 
σ2 democratic regime (S.E.) 0.0867 (0.0563) 
Deviance (d.f.=2) 5.6693 
σ 0 rather democratic regime (S.E.) -0.1179 (0.0601)
σ2 rather democratic regime  (S.E.) 0.1597 (0.0680)
Deviance (d.f.=2)  6.1315
σ 0 democratic regime (S.E.) -0.4395 (0.1601)
σ2 democratic regime  (S.E.) 0.4027 (0.1786)
Deviance (d.f.=2)  7.7119
  
Total Deviance for between 
countries variance-
covariance matrix (d.f.) 38.5370 (3)
 
 
38.1471 (8) 39.8276 (7)
  
Random Variances-Covariances between Years 
σ2 0 (S.E.) 0.1838 (0.0094) 0.1709 (0.0088) 0.1685 (0.0089)
σ 0 time (S.E.) -0.0024 (0.0003) -0.0021 (0.0003) -0.0020 (0.0003)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0001)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 52.0273 47.5252 47.7633
  
Total Deviance for between 
years variance-covariance 
matrix (d.f.=3) 869.9456
 
 
861.8876 858.4745
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations.  
d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
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Table 4: Estimated multilevel effects of individual democracy indicators on 
national homicide rates (ln) during the second half of the 20th century [1].  
 
 Competitive
-ness of 
Participat-
ion 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Competition
Executive 
Constraints 
Estimated Coefficients 
Time (centred) 0.0090# 0.0083# 0.0063*
 
Competitiveness of Participation (base: Unreg./ Suppr./ Restr. Transitional) 
 Factional/ Transitional 0.5450#
 Competitive 0.3126#
Deviance (d.f.=2) 31.5000
  
Executive Recruitment Competition (base: Unregulated/ Selection) 
 Dual/Transitional 0.1996*
 Election 0.3582#
Deviance (d.f.=2) 13.0564
 
Executive Constraints (base: Unlimited Authority) 
 Intermediate categories 0.1020
 Executive Parity or Subordination 0.4479#
Deviance (d.f.=2) 35.6429
 
Controls 
Percent population 15 to 24 yrs  3.4667# 3.4412# 3.3666#
Prosperity -0.0806# -0.0823# -0.0875#
Deviance (d.f.=2) 42.7411 43.3872 41.5016
East Europe 1.4765# 1.5434# 1.7065#
Latin America/ Caribbean 0.6079~ 0.6414~ 0.7629*
U.S. 1.7949** 1.7239# 1.6946*
Deviance (d.f.=3) 29.6649 66.7984 34.3770
 
Total Deviance for all estimated 
parameters (d.f.=8) 156.3229 145.8184 146.1843 
 
 Intercept  0.0386 0.0449  -0.0597
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations.  
d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
# p-value<0.005, ** 0.005<=p-value<0.01, * 0.01<=p-value<0.05, ~ 0.056=p-value<0.10. 
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Table 4: Estimated effects of individual democracy indicators on national 
homicide rates (ln) during the second half of the 20th century [1] (ctnd). 
 
 Competitive-
ness of 
Participation 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Competition 
Executive 
Constraints 
Estimated Variances-Covariances 
Random Variances-Covariances between Countries   
σ0
2 (S.E.) 0.4519 (0.1007) 0.6533 (0.1858) 0.4787 (0.1059)
σ 0 time  (S.E.) -0.0019 (0.0015) -0.0010 (0.0013)  0.0005 (0.0018)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0001)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 13.3663 12.6237 15.9954
σ 0 factional/ transitional  (S.E.) -0.1663 (0.0800) 
σ time factional/ transitional (S.E.)  0.0048 (0.0017) 
σ2 factional/ transitional  (S.E.) 0.2433 (0.0928) 
Deviance (d.f.=3) 9.3407
σ 0 election (S.E.) -0.2577 (0.1140)
σ2election (S.E.) 0.2043 (0.0858)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 6.0473
σ 0 intermediate (S.E.) -0.0442 (0.0438)
σ time intermediate (S.E.) -0.0026 (0.0011)
σ2intermediate  (S.E.) 0.0327 (0.0250)
Deviance (d.f.=3) 6.6149
 
Total Deviance for 
between countries 
variance-covariance 
matrix (d.f.) 
37.9671 (6) 38.9347 (5) 37.8991 (6)
 
Random Variances-Covariances between 
Years 
σ0
2 (S.E.) 0.1735 (0.0089) 0.1717 (0.0089) 0.1771 (0.0091)
σ 0 time (S.E.) -0.0022 (0.0003) -0.0022 (0.0003) -0.0022 (0.0003)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0000)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 49.1819 50.3286  50.1897
 
Total Deviance for 
between years variance-
covariance matrix 
(d.f.=3) 
864.3272
 
862.9291 864.2292
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations.  
d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
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 Table 5: Estimated multilevel effects of individual democracy indicators on 
the natural logarithm of national homicide rates during the second half of the 
20th century across the world [2].  
 
 Regulation of 
Participation 
Openness of 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Estimated Coefficients 
Time (centred) 0.0058* 0.0077**
 
Regulation of Participation (base: Multiple Identity) 
 Sectarian/ Restricted -0.2052*
 Regulated -0.1680~
Deviance (d.f.=2)  5.7912
  
Openness of Executive Recruitment (base: Unregulated)  
 Open 0.2393#
Deviance (d.f.=1) 12.7609
 
Controls 
Percent population 15 to 24 years old  3.1457# 3.3305#
Prosperity -0.0504# -0.0755#
Deviance (d.f.=2) 28.3866 37.2637
East Europe 1.1878# 1.3388#
Latin America/ Caribbean 1.0140# 0.8388*
U.S. 1.8457# 1.7657**
Deviance (d.f.=3) 47.7239 29.5360
 
Total Deviance for all estimated 
parameters (d.f.) 
128.8822 (8) 132.9383 
(7)
 
 Intercept  0.4685# 0.0603
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations.  
d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
# p-value<0.005, ** 0.005<=p-value<0.01, * 0.01<=p-value<0.05, ~ 0.058=p-value<0.10. 
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Table 5: Estimated effects of individual democracy indicators on the natural 
logarithm of national homicide rates during the second half of the 20th 
century across the world [2] (continued). 
 
 Competitive-
ness of 
Participation 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Competition 
Estimated Variances-Covariances 
Random Variances-Covariances between Countries  
σ0
2 (S.E.) 0.5716 (0.1456) 0.4075 (0.0885)
σ 0 time  (S.E.)  0.0013 (0.0025)  0.0012 (0.0019)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0003 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0001)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 15.8721 16.9621
σ 0 sectarian/ restricted  (S.E.) -0.0301 (0.0498)
σ2 sectarian/ restricted  (S.E.) 0.1070 (0.0557)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 4.0496
σ 0 regulated  (S.E.) -0.2198 (0.0865)
σ time regulated (S.E.) -0.0047 (0.0020)
σ2 regulated (S.E.) 0.1368 (0.0646)
Deviance (d.f.=3) 15.0607
Total Deviance for between countries 
variance-covariance matrix (d.f.) 41.2650 (8) 38.1819 (3)
 
Random Variances-Covariances between Years 
σ0
2 (S.E.) 0.1771 (0.0091) 0.1840 (0.0093)
σ 0 time (S.E.) -0.0023 (0.0003) -0.0024 (0.0003)
σ2 time (S.E.) 0.0002 (0.0000) 0.0002 (0.0000)
Deviance (d.f.=2) 52.0416 52.0698
 
Total Deviance for between years 
variance-covariance matrix (d.f.=3) 860.4821 870.1646
 
Note: Models are based on 1,827 observations.  
d.f.=degrees of freedom. 
 
